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UNIONS IN A FRAGMENTED SOCIETY 
CHRISTOPHER GRANT* 
INTRODUCTION 
In the opening paragraphs of Democracy’s Discontent, Michael 
Sandel observes: “Our public life is rife with discontent.  Americans 
do not believe they have much to say in how they are governed and 
do not trust the government to do the right thing.”1  He cites figures 
from a Gallup poll that three-fourths of Americans are “dissatisfied 
with the way the political process is working.”2  A similar percentage 
“believe[s] that government is run by a few big interests rather than 
for the benefit of all.”3  Additionally, Sandel sees in people the fear 
that “from family to neighborhood to nation, the moral fabric of 
community is unraveling around us.”4  Not only do Americans sense a 
loss of self-government, but we also lack the tools of tradition and 
moral belief to guide us in self-government.  This said, Sandel argues, 
the political arguments of the day are not at fault for our anxiety.  It is 
not as if we have made the wrong decisions about welfare or health 
care.  Rather, Sandel contends, it is our liberal public philosophy—
with its view of persons as free and independent selves, 
unencumbered by moral ties they have not chosen—that is to blame.  
That is, to come to grips with our anxiety, we must look beyond the 
political arguments that currently confound us to the theory that 
animates them.  Our discontent can be attributed to the rise of a 
liberal public philosophy over a republican one. 
Sandel does not dwell on the question of who feels discontented.  
His book is dedicated to explaining why people feel this way.  This is 
unfair criticism because Sandel is not a sociologist, but a political 
theorist.  Nevertheless, Sandel speaks broadly.  Seemingly all 
 
 * B.A., Carleton College, 1994; J.D., University of Illinois College of Law, 2001.  I am 
very thankful to Professor Carlos Ball for his guidance, and to my colleagues at Schuchat, Cook 
& Werner for their support. 
 1. MICHAEL SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT 3 (1996). 
 2. Id. at 353 n.1. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. at 3. 
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Americans to some extent are anxious these days.  Yet, this cannot 
truly be the case.  I doubt graduates of Harvard or Yale—the elite—
feel less powerful today than they did one hundred or two hundred 
years ago.  And I doubt the wealthy feel any less powerful today than 
they did in the eighteenth or nineteenth century.  They may not now 
be mostly white Protestants, and this is for the better.  But, 
disproportionately, they are the ones still making the important 
decisions.  Furthermore, one wonders who is feeling a loss of 
community.  Again, the elite, to the extent that they ever had a 
community, still have that community.  Certain other groups are also 
more resistant, though not impervious, to atomization.  For instance, 
recent immigrants tend to live together and to continue to hold onto 
their traditions and customs.  And African Americans, perhaps 
because they have historically been deprived of the right of self-
government, cling more strongly to their beliefs and politics.  African 
Americans in all social strata are more religiously observant, though 
their church attendance, like that of whites, has recently declined.5 
Who, then, is Sandel talking about?  One obvious answer is the 
working class, specifically the white working class.  There are two 
reasons for this answer.  First, more so than individuals in other 
groups, members of the working class suffer the effects of what 
Michael Walzer calls the Four Mobilities: geographic mobility, social 
mobility, marital mobility, and political mobility.6  Members are more 
likely to own a home today than a generation ago, but they spend 
more time commuting.7  Blue-collar workers suffer greater job 
instability, and feel more anxious.8  They endure high divorce rates.9  
And, they are politically apathetic, or at least are less likely to vote as 
than their parents.10  Second, as other nodes of community life, such 
as the church and the neighborhood group, disappear, the workplace 
has become increasingly central to identity.11  But having to work 
 
 5. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF 
AMERICAN COMMUNITY 76 (2000). 
 6. Michael Walzer, The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism, 18 POL. THEORY 6, 12–13 
(1990). 
 7. PUTNAM, supra note 5, at 205, 212–15. 
 8. See id. at 88–92.  However, white-collar workers also increasingly suffer from greater 
instability.  Id. at 89. 
 9. See id. at 277–79.  As does everyone else, but those who make less surely feel the 
effects of divorce more. 
 10. Witness the 2000 election furor over independent voters in such blue-collar states as 
Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. 
 11. “The long and short of it is this: Working for pay now occupies more of the time of 
more of our populace than ever.  The job has become a central part of most adults’ lives and 
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lower-wage jobs, contingent jobs, and sometimes multiple jobs, 
members of the working class struggle to make ends meet.  It is no 
wonder, then, that they feel disempowered and anxious.  They find 
themselves defined by jobs in which they have little personal invest-
ment.12 
With this in mind, Sandel’s book has important things to say 
about unions.  Democracy’s Discontent has generated great discussion 
among academics.13  But given the number of pages that Sandel 
spends mapping out a republican political economy, including his 
praise for the Knights of Labor and Samuel Gompers,14 it is surprising 
how few have taken to heart his ideas in relation to unions.  In 
republican politics, what is the role of unions?  What effect does a 
republican public philosophy have on labor law?  Certainly, we 
cannot, and should not, simply search to recapture the past.  In our 
global economy, that would be impossible.  Forces beyond one 
nation’s control prevent turning back the clock.  Moreover, such calls 
for a return to the past suggest a myopic romanticism.  To be sure, the 
working class was once far more engaged and farsighted.  But the 
working class could also be small minded.  Certain groups of immi-
grants dominated their unions to their own advantage, excluding 
other groups to those groups’ disadvantage. 
Thomas Kohler, for one, has explored what I would term a “re-
publican interpretation” of unions and labor law.  I will spend much 
of Part I of this Note examining his understanding of unions as 
“seedbeds of the civic virtues.”15  I will also address the liberal view of 
associations in general and unions in particular, paralleling the rise of 
“rights talk” in recent constitutional jurisprudence and the labor laws.  
 
being employed (by one or more employers) is the way people spend the major share of their 
waking hours.”  Thomas C. Kohler, The Overlooked Middle, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 229, 233 
(1993) [hereinafter Kohler, The Overlooked Middle]; see also PUTNAM, supra note 5, at 86. 
 12. Robert Putnam reports that Americans today are not working as hard as their parents 
did at the height of the civic boom in the 1960s.  Additionally, the free time available to less-
educated Americans has increased since the 1960s, while that of their college-educated 
counterparts has decreased.  PUTNAM, supra note 5, at 190.  Yet, Putnam finds that those with 
the heaviest time pressures are those who are more likely, not less likely, to be civically 
involved.  Id. at 191.  At first blush, this seems counterintuitive.  But it may be that those who 
feel less invested in their work feel less invested in civil society.  Interestingly enough, Putnam’s 
research indicates that watching television is the activity most lethal to community involvement.  
Id. at 216–46.  Do those with dull, menial jobs enjoy (need?) the escape of television more than 
those with interesting jobs? 
 13. See, e.g., DEBATING DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT (Anita L. Allen & Milton C. Regan, 
Jr. eds., 1998). 
 14. See SANDEL, supra note 1, at 123–273. 
 15. Thomas C. Kohler, Civic Virtue at Work: Unions as Seedbeds of the Civic Virtues, 36 
B.C. L. REV. 279, 295 (1995) [hereinafter Kohler, Civic Virtue at Work]. 
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Finally, I will propose that we pursue a pragmatic view, rather than a 
republican or liberal view, of associations based upon our fragmenta-
tion.  In Part II, then, I will consider majority rule in unions, and 
suggest that, following a pragmatic view, it would be preferable to 
adopt a scheme of nonmajority, or proportional, representation.16 
I. THEORETICAL VIEWS 
Section A analyzes republican and liberal views of associations.  
Section B examines the role of unions in light of these views.  Finally, 
Section C argues that taking a pragmatic view will improve efforts at 
reform.  If social fragmentation is our problem, then that is where we 
should begin. 
A. Republican and Liberal Views of Associations 
Democracy’s Discontent portrays American history as a clash of 
two competing public philosophies: liberalism and republicanism.  
Sandel’s thesis is short and sweet.  The liberal conception of freedom 
with its view of persons as free and independent selves, unencum-
bered by moral or civic ties that they have not chosen, is insufficient 
to address our current discontent.  “For despite its appeal, the liberal 
vision of freedom lacks the civic resources to sustain self-
government,” and it “cannot secure the liberty it promises, because it 
cannot inspire the sense of community and civic engagement that 
liberty requires.”17  By contrast, the republican conception of 
freedom, which once predominated, does speak to our discontent.  
With its view that liberty depends upon sharing in self-government, 
which in turn requires certain qualities of character, the republican 
conception is unafraid to take up and cultivate the needs of civic 
life—economic, moral, or otherwise.  That is, republican politics is a 
formative politics, willing to address the ends citizens espouse. 
Though Sandel does not deeply analyze the role of associations, 
throughout Democracy’s Discontent he praises Tocqueville’s philoso-
phy of using multiple and diverse civic and political bodies to fill the 
spaces between persons, and between persons and the state.  Such a 
“clamorous” republican politics, Sandel contends, is preferable to any 
 
 16. Of course, statutory reform would be necessary for any such scheme.  Currently, 
employers are only required to bargain with exclusive representatives. 
 17. SANDEL, supra note 1, at 6. 
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unitary vision of citizens as a single body, and is in fact necessary to 
the cultivation of civic virtues.18  Tocqueville’s republican politics 
does not despise differentiation. . . . [I]t fills this space with public 
institutions that gather people together in various capacities, that 
both separate and relate them.  These institutions include the town-
ships, schools, religions, and virtue-sustaining occupations that form 
the “character of mind” and “habits of the heart” a democratic re-
public requires.  Whatever their more particular purposes, these 
agencies of civic education inculcate the habit of attending to public 
things.19 
As noted above, Sandel prescribes a formative politics.  For the state 
and each citizen to be free, the state must have a stake in the charac-
ter of its citizens.  Sandel admits that “bad communities may form bad 
characters.”20  But it is not entirely clear whether Sandel would have 
the government intervene in associational life to prevent the 
formation of bad characters.  For instance, what are we to do about 
obstinate ascriptive affiliations, such as religious fundamentalist 
groups, that ferment hate?  Sandel seems to walk a fine line.  On the 
one hand, he recognizes that associational obligations can claim 
citizens, so that these groups in some way transcend the state.21  On 
the other hand, Sandel espouses a freedom among individuals and 
groups that is only possible in a shared culture within a state.  Thus, it 
seems for Sandel that freedom is only possible where associations and 
the democratic state arise concurrently.22 
This said, Sandel’s republicanism, with its understanding of the 
self claimed by community, is particularly sensitive to using certain 
 
 18. Id. at 319–20. 
 19. Id. at 320–21 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 347 (stressing the republican benefits of 
political bodies between the individual and the state, such as townships). 
 20. Id. at 321. 
 21. In fact, liberalism first goes wrong, Sandel argues, in its inability to account for 
obligations we recognize to groups above and beyond obligations we recognize to the state.  If 
we understand ourselves as free and independent selves, by which we only owe respect to others 
as free and independent selves, we cannot explain why we sometimes feel more loyal to some 
than others.  Yet, we often do.  The prototypical example is Robert E. Lee, who, even though he 
opposed secession, chose his home, the South, over his country, the Union.  Id. at 13–17. 
 22. When discussing associations, Sandel cites Hegel.  Id.  at 401 n.7 (citing G.W.F. HEGEL, 
PHILOSOPHY OF THE RIGHT (T.M. Knox trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1952) (1821)).  Nancy 
Rosenblum would argue that Sandel is misreading Tocqueville and Hegel in that Sandel too 
closely equates associational life and citizenship.  She contends that theorists taking a 
“mediating approach” to civil society, following Tocqueville, can only hope that associations will 
cultivate benign and democratic dispositions in their members.  NANCY ROSENBLUM, 
MEMBERSHIP AND MORALS 41–45 (1998).  This view, she says, “rests . . . on an airy liberal 
expectancy.”  Id. at 45.  Moreover, this view ignores Hegel’s lesson that “[a]ssociation 
membership is a distinctive ‘moment’ in social and personal life.  It cannot be dissolved into 
citizenship.”  Id. at 46. 
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ties and attachments to cultivate a concern for the whole.  Group life 
educates people in the exercise of citizenship by familiarizing them 
with cooperation and directing them to common ends beyond 
immediate self-interest.  Such lessons, Sandel contends, get the short 
shrift today, as political liberalism, which gives priority to individual 
choice of values, is unwilling to address the virtues essential to 
citizenship.  Further, under political liberalism, the work of associa-
tions has been usurped by the state.  Despite the liberal view of the 
freely-choosing and autonomous self, relations between persons are 
increasingly no longer left to individuals themselves, but are guided 
by social legislation.23 
Like Sandel, Thomas Kohler argues that our present public phi-
losophy is insufficient.  Kohler asks “whether modern liberalism, with 
its limited conception of community, ends up by undermining the 
social conditions necessary to sustain its noble project of enhancing 
individual status and personal liberty.”24  And, like Sandel, Kohler 
argues that a republican conception of freedom is preferable.25  Such a 
conception begins with the proper understanding of the ‘self.’  In 
contrast to liberalism, which abstracts the individual, the republican 
conception takes humans as “situated beings” and intelligible “only in 
relation to those associations that fundamentally condition human 
existence.”26  Communities, in fact, give us our identity.  They tell us 
“the purpose and significance of our lives.”  From this, it is but a small 
step to a formative politics that addresses ends: 
[C]ommunities have a normative function, and well-functioning 
communities represent an irreducible human good.  In this perspec-
tive, communities and associations [of every sort] exist only for the 
individual.  Yet, the social good is prior—stands at a higher level 
than—the individual good, because without it, the good for dis-
crete, individual persons could not exist.27 
Kohler also emphasizes the importance of associations.  Follow-
ing Tocqueville, he stresses the “importance of mediating groups and 
 
 23. SANDEL, supra note 1, at 116–19. 
 24. Thomas C. Kohler, Individualism and Communitarianism at Work, 1993 BYU L. REV. 
727, 740–41 [hereinafter Kohler, Individualism and Communitarianism at Work]. 
 25. Kohler does not call himself a republican.  Nevertheless, his reasoning is republican.  I 
want to be careful not to conflate Tocqueville, republicans, and communitarians because there 
are essential differences between the three. 
 26. Thomas C. Kohler, Setting the Conditions for Self-Rule: Unions, Associations, Our First 
Amendment Discourse and the Problem of DeBartolo, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 149, 206 [hereinafter 
Kohler, Setting the Conditions for Self-Rule]. 
 27. Kohler, Civic Virtue at Work, supra note 27, at 295. 
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their potential to act as schools for democracy.”28  In coming together, 
individuals must take control over their own affairs and learn to work 
with others.  In doing so, they learn the habits essential to self-
government.  Associating requires a common effort to some end, and 
so requires that individuals deliberate and reflect upon their goals.  
Or, associations “set the conditions for the sort of civic friendships 
that hold a society together and that facilitate the civil conversations 
that ground self-rule.”29  Through them, we learn critical virtues such 
as tolerance, cooperation, and independence, and “gain some sense of 
the fullness of our . . . potencies.”30  Without them, we withdraw and 
society breaks down. 
Naturally, liberal theorists do not dismiss associations.  In fact, 
liberal theorists make them a priority.  John Rawls, for one, describes 
the just society as “social union of social unions.”31  On its face, such a 
description does not seem all that different than Sandel’s and 
Kohler’s understanding of associations as mediating bodies or 
“schools for democracy.”  It recognizes that the state requires tolerant 
citizens, and that democracy depends upon associations to cultivate 
the requisite civic habits and moral dispositions.  Behind this 
similarity, there are sharp differences.  Rawls is careful to distinguish 
between the state and associations: “A well-ordered democratic 
society is neither a community nor, more generally, an association.”32  
Most importantly, a democratic society “is also closed . . . in that entry 
into it is only by birth and exit from it is only by death” and a 
democratic society “has no final ends and aims in the way that 
persons or associations do.”33  That is, Rawls, unlike Sandel and 
Kohler, does not conflate citizenship with associational life.  Freedom 
does not rest on the integration of the individual into the state 
through associations.  Rather, separation of the state from associa-
tions preserves freedom for the individual.  Typically, liberals speak 
of separate spheres—public and private.  Any talk of aims or ends in 
the public sphere must fall under a political conception of justice and 
its public reason.  This means, as indicated by the liberal conception 
of the self, that citizens cannot think there are certain values that 
justify the belief that some people have intrinsically more worth to 
 
 28. Kohler, Individualism and Communitarianism at Work, supra note 24, at 730–31. 
 29. Id. at 731. 
 30. Id. 
 31. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 527 (1971). 
 32. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 40 (1993). 
 33. Id. at 40–41. 
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society than others.  Instead, society owes respect to each person 
equally as a free and independent self.34  By contrast, people in the 
private sphere may join together to pursue other—even elitist—
values.  People may choose their groups and choose their values. 
Sidestepping Sandel’s claim, for the moment, that individuals 
cannot simply choose their groups and values but are sometimes 
chosen by groups and values, the liberal view considers the state as 
prior to the group or existing before the group.  According to liberal 
theory, democratic authority is only possible once talk of aims and 
ends has been removed from the public sphere and relegated to the 
private.  “The designation of a distinctive public sphere [is meant] to 
control the influence of private associations.”35  The state maintains a 
neutral stance towards associations in that it does not favor one group 
over another and it limits any one group’s influence in the public 
sphere (such as that of a religious group).  Further, to ensure such 
limits, the state may restrict the power that associations exercise over 
their own members.36  That is, to some extent, the state may intervene 
in association policies and practices.  If the state could not, and 
associations could, for example, compel membership or exclude 
whomever they wanted, then associations could deprive individuals of 
the very things—individual liberty and equal worth—that the state is 
meant to preserve and protect.  For this reason, certain liberals 
believe that associations that exact too heavy a toll on excluded 
individuals may be treated as if they were arms of the state by 
subjecting them to the same standards of respect for individual rights 
as apply to the state.37  Or, as put by others, the goal is “congruence 
between the internal life . . . of . . . groups” and public norms and 
culture.38  For example, discriminatory private groups may be forced 
to accept members when exclusion results in second-class citizenship.  
Of course, few advocate congruence to every group and every private 
practice.  To be viable, groups must have some authority to discipline 
their members.  Otherwise, groups cannot protect what they stand 
for.  But, as more and more aspects of group life are constitutional-
ized, groups find it increasingly harder to preserve their beliefs. 
 
 34. Id. at 41. 
 35. NANCY ROSENBLUM, ANOTHER LIBERALISM 60 (1987). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Voluntarists speak of the principle of symmetry.  See SHELDON LEADER, FREEDOM OF 
ASSOCIATION: A STUDY IN LABOR LAW AND POLITICAL THEORY 52 (1992). 
 38. See Nancy Rosenblum, Compelled Association: Public Standing, Self-Respect, and the 
Dynamic of Exclusion, in FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 75, 75 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1998). 
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B. The Role of Unions and Developments in Labor Law 
Sandel makes brief mention of unions: “Family, neighborhood, 
religion, trade unions, reform movements, and local government all 
offer examples of practices that have at times served to educate 
people in the exercise of citizenship by cultivating the habits of 
membership and orienting people to common goods beyond their 
private ends.”39  Kohler, a labor law professor, is more explicit.  
Kohler argues that unions are essential because they can and do 
involve people in a conversation “about what ought to be valued and 
why.”40  Though the conversations of collective bargaining may seem 
trivial—concerning promotions, seniority, wage rates, health insur-
ance, and the like—Kohler thinks it a mistake to discount the 
mundane.  It is not so much the subject that is important, but the 
practice.  These types of discussions force individuals to make hard 
choices about the rules that determine their daily work lives and then 
justify these decisions to others.41  They require that we learn to 
compromise, and they get us in the habit of self-directed action.  
“Individuals and societies alike become and remain self-governing 
only by repeatedly and regularly engaging in acts of self-government.  
It is the habit that sustains the condition.”42  Certainly, employment 
does not wholly define the individual.  Work is something that 
individuals often hope to avoid.  But, at the very least, setting 
contract goals, deciding strategy, and bargaining become an 
important dimension of a worker’s experience.  Moreover, such 
practices require that workers learn to tolerate setbacks and 
differences of opinion. 
Of particular interest to Kohler is the decline in union member-
ship over the last few decades.  Approximately 34 percent of the US 
private-sector workforce was organized in 1960.  By 1992, only 12 
percent was organized, and the percentage continues to fall.43  There 
are countless theories explaining this phenomenon, including 
globalization, increasing employer opposition, and weak enforcement 
of labor laws.  But, as Kohler astutely notes, these figures are not 
 
 39. SANDEL, supra note 1, at 117 (emphasis added). 
 40. Kohler, Civic Virtue at Work, supra note 27, at 299. 
 41. Kohler, Individualism and Communitarianism at Work, supra note 24, at 734. 
 42. Kohler, Civic Virtue at Work, supra note 27, at 298. 
 43. Kohler, Individualism and Communitarianism at Work, supra note 24, at 734–35 (citing 
U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1992, at 422 
(112th ed. 1992)). 
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unique to unions.44  Data suggests that over the past thirty years 
participation in a wide variety of civic associations has plummeted.  
Since 1970, Elks lodges have lost 46 percent of their members; since 
1969, the League of Women Voters has lost 61 percent of its mem-
bers; and, since 1966, the PTA has lost 60 percent of its members.45 
Understanding why membership in civic associations, such as 
neighborhood groups, religion, reform movements, and unions, has 
declined is not easy.  Both Sandel and Kohler agree that it has 
something to do with the limitations of political liberalism.  Sandel 
states: “[T]he procedural republic is often inhospitable to claims 
premised on self-definitions such as these.  It brackets the constitutive 
ties that the republican tradition sees as essential to political educa-
tion.”46  And, Kohler notes: “[W]e increasingly no longer see the need 
for or the significance of these mediating bodies. . . . Briefly stated, we 
suffer from an odd sort of blindness: we can only see individuals.”47  
More specifically, Sandel traces our predicament to changes in our 
constitutional jurisprudence and Kohler to changes in labor and 
employment law.  
Sandel spends the first one-third of his book tracing the 
ascendancy of “rights talk” and the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments.48  By the mid-1940s, the Supreme Court had assumed 
as its primary role the protection of individual rights.49  It defined 
those rights according to the requirement that the Constitution be 
read as neutral among ends, and defended that neutrality as essential 
to respecting persons as free and independent selves, unencumbered 
by moral ties they have not chosen.50  As a result, the Court no longer 
justified the rights of free speech and association on the grounds that 
they are important for the pursuit of truth or the exercise of self-
government; the Court justified these rights in the name of individual 
fulfillment and self-creation.51  Free speech and association were no 
longer considered to derive from the collective or ascriptive 
affiliations, but explained on personal and voluntary grounds.  In 
short, the Court decreed that individuals should have the right to 
 
 44. Id. at 735. 
 45. See generally PUTNAM, supra note 5, app. at 437–44. 
 46. SANDEL, supra note 1, at 117. 
 47. Civic Virtue at Work, supra note 27, at 294. 
 48. SANDEL, supra note 1. 
 49. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (holding that states 
cannot compel children to pledge allegiance to the country at the start of each school day). 
 50. See SANDEL, supra note 1, at 50–52. 
 51. See id. at 53–55, 79–80. 
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decide for themselves what they want to say and hear and what 
groups they want to join or not join.  It is no surprise, then, to see in 
the Court’s decisions a growing animosity towards group duties and 
attachments.  Increasingly, the Court considers associational life as a 
threat to self-creation.  As Kohler notes, we see this in the rise of the 
freedom not to associate.52  A large part of First Amendment law is 
now dedicated to sheltering individuals from associational 
obligation.53  Persons should have the right to contract with others to 
serve their ends, but should not be bound by that association beyond 
the contract.  They should have the right to leave a group when they 
want, and should not be penalized by the group for exercising that 
right. 
A brief history of the Wagner Act is useful when examining 
changes in the labor law.  Enacted in 1935, the Wagner Act54 was 
designed to protect and enhance the status of individuals by defend-
ing the right to join autonomous employee groups and to bargain with 
employers over the conditions of employment.  The Act is unique 
because, unlike other liberal legislation providing private rights of 
action, it encourages the creation of mediating bodies “to promote 
individual empowerment and to foster self-determination.”55  
Through collective bargaining, the Wagner Act helps to involve 
individuals in the process of making the rules that determine their 
lives.  The affected parties—employees, employer, and union—alone 
work out their disputes with their agreement standing as “a system of 
industrial self-government.”56  The state is not to intervene.  For 
example, it has long been held that the state cannot force any side to 
accept any specific contract terms57 and cannot regulate the choice of 
economic weapons that may be used.58 
The Wagner Act is not unlike other liberal legislation in that it 
serves to level the playing field.  If businesspersons are allowed to 
 
 52. Kohler, Setting the Conditions for Self-Rule, supra note 26, at 181–86. 
 53. Id.  A seminal case is Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977), where 
the Court held that government employees working in a unionized workplace may be required 
to pay union services charges, but that the First Amendment was violated where they were 
forced to pay for expression of political views with which they disagreed. 
 54. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (1992). 
 55. Kohler, Individualism and Communitarianism at Work, supra note 24, at 732–34; see 
also Walzer, supra note 6, at 17 (“This was not a standard liberal law, hindering the hindrances 
of union organization, for it actively fostered union organization.”). 
 56. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 580 
(1960). 
 57. NLRB v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952). 
 58. NLRB v. Ins. Agents’ Int’l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960). 
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organize into corporations, why should workers not be allowed to 
organize into unions?  The Act stands in contrast to earlier attempts 
at political reform by groups such as the Knights of Labor.59  Its focus 
is freedom of contract.  It does not attempt system-wide reform; it 
embraces rather than challenges the wage system.60  In adopting a 
system of “industrial democracy,” the Act lays out means for 
promoting economic equality.  It allows workers to organize as a 
check against industrial despotism and brings a rule of law to the 
workplace.  “Industrial democracy” does not mean management by 
democracy, giving workers the power to remove and elect managers.  
It means that workers have the right to seek redress of their griev-
ances against management.61 
Stated succinctly, the republican view, Kohler’s view, sees the 
union as a positive in itself, since participation in the union allows 
workers to develop the habits necessary for self-direction.  In 
adopting a private system of ordering, where the parties themselves 
resolve their common concerns, the Act recognizes that the union is 
an independent association with its own personality and moral 
purposes.  Along these lines, Kohler notes that through the Act, 
Congress did not invent collective bargaining, but only adopted a 
scheme that had been developed over time by workers and employ-
ers.62  The Act did not create unions, but simply acknowledged their 
existence.  By contrast, the liberal view sees the union merely as a 
means to secure strategic ends, such as income, for its members.  The 
Act permits unionization for the purposes of self-help, but the union 
is limited to the purposes for which employees originally joined. 
Like constitutional law, labor law has undergone a transforma-
tion over the past century.  The Taft-Hartley Amendments are the 
best evidence.  Originally, the Wagner Act simply stated: “Employees 
shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join or assist labor 
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their 
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the 
 
 59. Following a republican view, the Knights believed that popular government depended 
upon the virtue of the masses for its success.  In their eyes, the wage labor system was a threat to 
society as it bred dependence and vice.  Accordingly, they called for the creation of a 
cooperative commonwealth to restore the independence of workers.  SANDEL, supra note 1, at 
185–87. 
 60. See id. at 197–200. 
 61. See Richard R. Carlson, The Origin and Future of Exclusive Representation in 
American Labor Law, 30 DUQ. L. REV. 779, 809–10 (1990). 
 62. Kohler, Individualism and Communitarianism at Work, supra note 24, at 734. 
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purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”63  
However, in 1947 Congress added that employees “shall also have the 
right to refrain from any or all of such activities.”64  In contrast to the 
old section 7, under which the government openly encouraged 
unionization, the new Section 7 emphasized employee choice.  By 
putting association on equal terms with nonassociation, the new 
section shows a distrust of association.  It inhibits the formation of 
unions.  The organized are not as concerned if the government 
remains neutral.  But, the unorganized, who are easily cowed by the 
imbalance of power between employer and employee, need the 
government to be proactive.  There is a significant psychological 
difference between “the President wants you to unionize” and “the 
President could care less if you unionize.”  Moreover, the new section 
suggests that individuals do not need a union to get just as much out 
of the workplace.  The union is simply an affiliation—no more, no 
less.  Employees may ally themselves with others, but only they may 
make that choice.  Employees may join a union with the hope of 
securing additional income, but those who choose not to join are only 
giving up on the hope that the union can secure more. 
Further indications of a shift from a republican to a liberal con-
ception of the self in labor law appear in the state’s growing role in 
the workplace.65  Congress and state legislatures continue to expand 
prohibitions against discrimination in employment decisions.66  Where 
unions once took up these issues in collective bargaining, the law now 
dictates them.  In addition, common law courts have developed a tort 
of wrongful termination.  Typically, an employee may sue if he thinks 
he has been fired in violation of public policy.  The aim is congruence 
between the workplace and public norms and culture.  To protect 
individual choice, work life cannot deviate too far from public life.  
Finally, the Supreme Court has imposed upon unions a duty of fair 
representation of their members.67  Noting the power of the union 
majority, the Court deemed it necessary to develop a doctrine to 
protect minority union members.68  Because the union is so powerful, 
 
 63. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1947). 
 64. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1992). 
 65. See generally Kohler, Individualism and Communitarianism at Work, supra note 24, at 
737. 
 66. Consider, for example, the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102–12213 
(1992). 
 67. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). 
 68. See id. at 177–78. 
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in that individuals who are excluded from its processes bear serious 
costs, the state may treat the union as an arm of the state, subjecting it 
to similar standards of respect for individual rights. 
C. A Pragmatic View 
Let us reconsider our discontent.  According to Sandel and 
Kohler, because of political liberalism, society is now the home of 
isolated, egotistical agents.  We are directionless and divided by our 
rights.  We have at last shed the weight of superstition, as public 
reason is paramount, but find ourselves “slipping into a fragmented, 
storyless condition.”69  If this description were right, though, one 
would think that liberalism would be the best way to deal with our 
political predicament.  If we are isolated selves, and if we have to 
build a society, should we not begin from Rawls’s original position, 
where from some imaginary point we are forced to find ways to agree 
with one another?  Given our increasing division and difference, 
should we not try reform based upon that division and difference?  If 
society is so fragmented, then our first concern should be procedural 
justice.  We must take as our guide a principle of tolerance between 
members of conflicting associations.  So long as people have a variety 
of exclusive ends, government ought not to favor one group over 
another, but should treat each with equal respect. 
The above is a pragmatic view.  It contends that theorists like 
Sandel and Kohler should give up on a return to virtue.  Their 
arguments take on a romantic longing, if not for the past, then for 
some overarching ideal.  Sandel and Kohler might respond that it is 
not that society is hopelessly fragmented, but that liberalism misrep-
resents our true condition.  Kohler writes: “People are by nature 
social beings.”70  Thus, when liberals speak of autonomous selves and 
argue that all obligations are contractual, they are lying to themselves.  
Individuals cannot escape community.  We just do not see that we are 
bound together.  However, this argument makes the mistake of 
granting liberalism as a public philosophy too much power.  Sandel 
argues that public philosophy is implicit in our social practices.71  
Similarly, Kohler states, “Ideas do have consequences.”72  But is it not 
the case that according to Sandel’s and Kohler’s accounts of the 
 
 69. SANDEL, supra note 1, at 351. 
 70. Kohler, Civic Virtue at Work, supra note 27, at 299. 
 71. SANDEL, supra note 1, at ix–x. 
 72. Kohler, Setting the Conditions for Self-Rule, supra note 26, at 208. 
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liberal conception of freedom, that conception is not the cause of all 
our problems but simply is an expression of our problems?  One 
wonders why the republican view lost to the liberal view.  There are 
countless material explanations for the recent transformations in 
constitutional and labor law, not the least of which are the industrial 
revolution and, later, globalization.  One wonders why republicanism, 
if right, cannot summon our buried social feelings, our connections, 
and our traditions.  On this point, I think Sandel and Kohler make the 
mistake of forgetting that liberalism—“rights talk”—is our tradition.  
This country is the product of continuing aspirations for greater 
freedom—from the church, from other men, and from our own fears.  
If we really are situated beings, we should not shirk those aspirations. 
Perhaps, then, Sandel and Kohler are wrong to think that once 
we have a correct conception of the self we can right society.  As 
Richard Rorty argues, it is not clear that a correct conception of the 
self helps: 
But we minimalist liberals do not need a theory of the self to make 
a distinction between more reflective and less reflective people.  
We can just say that you get more reflective people, people better 
suited for the responsibilities of self-government, whenever you 
provide more education, security, leisure.  This is not a philosophi-
cal point, but just the empirical observation that people who enjoy 
more of these three goods are better able to consider alternative 
scenarios for their personal futures, and for the futures of their so-
cieties.73 
Rorty in fact agrees with Sandel’s understanding of the self.  He sees 
the self as a “network of beliefs and desires.”74  Pursuing such a 
historical view, he thinks it a mistake to try to measure society by 
asking whether its citizens have the right beliefs.  The only means he 
sees that we have for measuring our society is to compare ourselves to 
other societies and our own history.75  If that is the case, then our 
society is not doing so poorly after all, as our society has “the best 
track record among the regimes which we have tried so far.”76  This 
puts us back in the position of having to accept our society’s history 
and traditions.  In liberal societies, many people benefit from 
education, security, and leisure.  These people generally fare well in 
 
 73. Richard Rorty, A Defense of Minimalist Liberalism, in DEBATING DEMOCRACY’S 
DISCONTENT, supra note 13, at 117, 118–19. 
 74. Id. at 119. 
 75. Id. at 118–19. 
 76. Id.  Even Sandel notes our country’s achievements over the last half-century, including 
“victory in World War II, unprecedented affluence, greater social justice for women and 
minorities, [and] the end of the Cold War.”  SANDEL, supra note 1, at 3. 
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society and often create good ideas on how to improve society.  Of 
course, this is an American-centric history.  But it is unclear whether 
reason can reach beyond our history.  Stated differently, we might 
criticize religious fundamentalists as bad citizens not because their 
ideas are based on the wrong conception of the self, but because 
under our tradition their ideas cannot be taken seriously.  We attempt 
to engage them in political debate, but they refuse to consider other 
viewpoints.77 
There is considerable diversity in our country today, and a great 
number of distinct groups because of that diversity.  It is not apparent 
that such groups serve society well under either a republican or 
liberal view.  Individuals increasingly feel divided from one another, 
resulting in a fragmented social condition.  What we need, then, is 
reform based upon that fragmentation.  For unions, this means, for 
example, seriously considering the widespread use of contingent work 
arrangements.78  Most unions have been undecided about how to 
handle contingent workers because most unions are organized around 
a single plant or industry where workers only get the benefit of the 
union once they come to that plant or industry.  But, one idea is for 
unions to serve as temporary agencies for contingent workers.  This is 
not a new idea in the sense that many craft unions serve as training 
centers and hiring halls.  It suggests, though, that unions can exist for 
purposes other than collective bargaining.  That is, we need not 
define the role of unions to and by the negotiation of wage rates and 
health benefits.  We can think of unions also as serving, and develop-
ing, the whole person.  Further, with the plethora of federal and state 
statutes now applicable to the workplace, unions are needed to watch 
over the workplace.  Most employees do not understand regulations 
about employment discrimination and health and safety, but unions 
do.  By the same token, unions may serve as political advocates.  
Because many contingent workers are women and minorities, unions 
can provide them the voice they lack in the political arena. 
 
 77. Nevertheless, republican ideas are an integral part of our tradition and we can engage 
republican thinkers in political debate. 
 78. See Matthew Finkin, The Road Not Taken: Some Thoughts of Nonmajority Employee 
Representation, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 195, 217–18 (1993) [hereinafter Finkin, Road Not Taken].  
A statistical snapshot taken in February 1995 showed that contingent workers constituted 
between 2.2 percent to 4.9 percent of the workforce, and that somewhere between 5 and 12.8 
percent of part-time workers were contingent.  Further, a disproportionate number of 
contingent workers were female and black.  See also Thomas C. Kohler & Matthew W. Finkin, 
Bonding and Flexibility: Employment Ordering in a Relationless Age, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 379, 
400 (1998). 
  
2002] UNIONS IN A FRAGMENTED SOCIETY 865 
 
II. THE PROBLEM OF MAJORITY REPRESENTATION 
A healthy skepticism of republicanism, coupled with a view that 
collective bargaining need not be the only, or defining, concern of 
unions, suggests that we revisit the principles of labor law.  Specifi-
cally, I want to explore the concept of exclusive representation.  The 
current conception of majority rule is rooted in a republican view of 
associations, modified by a liberal concern for minority rights.  I 
believe a better scheme of nonmajority representation may be rooted 
in a pragmatic view of our fragmentation. 
Section 9(a) of the Wagner Act provides: 
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collec-
tive bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropri-
ate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all 
the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining 
in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other 
conditions of employment.79 
Kohler notes that the “exclusivity principle bottoms the American 
model of collective bargaining.”80  He explains: 
The exclusivity principle rests on the idea of majority rule.  The 
principle establishes the association formed by a majority of 
employees in the affected workplace unit as the exclusive 
representative of them all.  The principle prohibits an employer 
from attempting to bypass the majority-designated representative 
by unilaterally changing the terms or conditions of employment, or 
by dealing with individuals or groups independently of the union.81 
Prior to the Wagner Act, trade unions generally bargained just for 
their members.  If a union wanted exclusivity, the union had to coerce 
it from both the employer and the employees it wanted to serve.82  
Naturally, such coercion raised doubts as to the legitimacy of the 
union’s claim to exclusive representation.  It was clearly lawful for 
unions to compel participation by shunning nonmembers.  But it was 
clearly wrong for unions to prohibit employers from hiring non-
members.83  As a result, when Congress drafted the Wagner Act, 
labor leaders sought to include section 9(a) to supply a legal basis, 
and thereby greater legitimacy, to exclusive representation.84  Of 
 
 79. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1992). 
 80. Kohler, Individualism and Communitarianism at Work, supra note 24, at 733. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Carlson, supra note 61, at 791–803. 
 83. Id. at 792. 
 84. Id. at 810–11; Kenneth Casebeer, Drafting Wagner’s Act: Leon Keyserling and the 
Precommittee Drafts of the Labor Disputes Act and the National Labor Relations Act, 11 INDUS. 
REL. L.J. 73, 97–98 (1989). 
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course, the law is no less coercive; the reasons behind the principle 
lend it legitimacy. 
It is easy to see why republicans find the exclusivity principle so 
appealing.  For republicans, majority rule is the cardinal means of 
political action.  Every member of the community must have the 
opportunity to come together and discuss the pros and cons of a 
certain proposal before the community may take action.85  The people 
do not decide upon the common good through coercion, but through 
persuasion and habituation.  By contrast, liberals find the principle, at 
least theoretically, less appealing.  For liberals, majority rule poses a 
threat to individual freedom.  It restricts choice and leads to 
oppression.  In groups that are run by majority rule, liberals want 
some individual protection or the right to come and go.  Liberals 
appreciate that the Wagner Act ensures the right to organize and 
protects individuals from discrimination by their employers because 
of their union affiliation.  But they do not see why individuals must 
give up control of their lives to a union, especially if they feel that 
they can do better without one.  Individuals should have the right to 
join a union, but also should have the right not to join. 
Recall that under the republican conception of freedom, democ-
racy is realized through a network of independent groups operating 
within, but independent of, the state.  Often, these groups claim our 
allegiance.  This means that our choice to ally ourselves with them is 
not voluntary.  For example, Robert E. Lee opposed secession; yet, 
he concluded that his obligation to the South outweighed his obliga-
tion to the Union.  Lee would have sided with the Union had he been 
able to make that decision free of all other considerations.  But, 
certain factors limited his freedom of choice.  Nevertheless, Sandel 
and Kohler praise involuntary associations because they can cultivate 
the virtues necessary for self-government. Lee recognized that his 
association with the South was, in a sense, an involuntary tie that 
superceded personal choice.  Though we may not approve of the 
 
 85. Tocqueville writes: 
What is understood by a republican government in the United States is the slow and 
quiet action of society upon itself.  It is a regular state of things really founded upon 
the enlightened will of the people.  It is a conciliatory government, under which 
resolutions are allowed time to ripen, and in which they are deliberately discussed, and 
are executed only when mature. . . . What is called the republic in the United States is 
the tranquil rule of the majority, which, after having had time to examine itself and to 
give proof of its existence, is the common source of all powers of the state. 
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 416 (Phillips Bradley ed., Henry Reeve 
trans., Vintage Books 1990) (1835). 
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choice he made, Lee was conscious of the circumstances of his life, 
and conversely aware of broader possibilities.  Democracy depends, 
then, upon involuntary associations.  Citizens can be free and self-
governing without having the right to leave an association just 
because they would prefer not to be part of that association.  
Similarly, then, employees may be subject to a union. 
By contrast, under the liberal conception of freedom, democracy 
is realized through a network of groups that exist independently of 
the state.  The classic formulation is that the interplay between 
various groups prevents permanent division into majority and 
minority.86  The state is neutral, while groups compete for members.  
As such, no group can make an exclusive claim to an individual’s 
allegiance, and every group must allow members to leave when they 
choose.  This view is premised on the ability of individuals to choose 
between their groups and their values, to be unencumbered selves 
who can freely pursue their personal preferences.  It follows that 
liberals advocate an open freedom of association: “The liberal 
separation between public and private spheres, and endorsement of 
pluralism within them, encourages both access to groups in which one 
has ‘voice’ and the possibility of ‘exit’ from them as equally important 
parts of freedom of association.”87  Democracy depends, then, upon 
voluntary association.  When liberals confront a group that is not 
voluntary because it exercises so much power over its members and 
that it is impossible for them to leave, then the liberals suggest the 
state may remove the group’s ability to sanction members or that the 
group should be held to constitutional standards.  An employee 
should then have the right not to join others in a union. 
Two types of arguments are made in support of the exclusivity 
principle.  First, the principle is necessary for readjusting the balance 
of power between management and labor.  It is easy to see how 
unanimous cooperation is helpful in bargaining.  If even a few 
employees are able to bypass the union’s control of collective 
bargaining and negotiate their own wages and benefits, then others 
will soon view unions as unnecessary and try to negotiate their own 
wages and benefits.88  Any variation in contract terms sends the 
message that things could be better without the union and thus is a 
 
 86. This is Madison’s method for providing against majority tyranny.  THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 51 (James Madison). 
 87. ROSENBLUM, supra note 35, at 60 (taking the terms from ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, 
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threat to the union.  Also, without exclusive representation, disrup-
tive competition between unions could arise.  An employer might 
encourage a union to compromise by offering to recognize it over 
another union.89  Exclusive representation is necessary to maintain 
orderly industrial relations.  It is, at the very least, an administrative 
headache for an employer to deal with multiple unions representing 
otherwise identical employees.90  Conversely, an employer can take 
seriously a union’s no-strike pledge where one union is in control, 
since there is less of a threat of individual action like a wildcat strike.91 
Various commentators are unpersuaded by the argument that 
the principle is necessary for readjusting the balance of power 
between management and labor.  They have suggested in its place a 
scheme of “members only” representation.  Their contentions need 
not be fully repeated here.  Simply put, they find the benefits of 
exclusive representation overblown, and think alternative models not 
only workable92 but also essential if unions are to survive.93  Consider 
that the Wagner Act does not give unions the benefit of exclusivity in 
strikes, as an employee can resign her membership and cross a picket 
line.94  Nor does the Act give unions the benefit of exclusivity when it 
comes to financial support, as states may grant employees in a 
unionized workplace the option of not paying union dues.95  It may be 
that unanimous cooperation is not necessary for strikes and financial 
support.  Strikes of even limited numbers can cause enough trouble to 
force an employer to make concessions.  And many employees will 
want to join the union so they can participate in its governance and be 
involved in decisions about bargaining.  But these arguments support 
the proposition that nonmajority unions may be as effective as 
majority unions.  Moreover, exclusivity does not necessarily improve 
a union’s ability to get a good contract.  For example, if the union 
strikes when members are divided over an offer, some members may 
 
 89. However, section 8(a)(2) of the Wagner Act makes it an unfair labor practice for an 
employer to form its own associations or contribute support to one union over another.  29 
U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1992). 
 90. Finkin, Road Not Taken, supra note 78, at 200. 
 91. Carlson, supra note 61, at 789. 
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 94. See Pattern Makers’ League of N. Am. v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95 (1985). 
 95. 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1992). 
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choose to cross the picket line and the union might not have the 
internal strength to reject the offer. 
The second type of argument in support of exclusivity analogizes 
to the political model.  The drafters of the Wagner Act adapted a 
theory of “industrial democracy” to collective bargaining.96  Reform-
ists believed that collective bargaining ought to be more than the 
negotiation of terms and conditions of employment.  It should lead to 
the creation of a “constitution” for the workplace.97  If “industrial 
democracy” did not mean management by democracy, it at least 
implied majority rule, and the claim that the union, if democratically 
elected by a majority of employees, should have the right to speak for 
all.98  In two early cases—J.I. Case Co. v. National Labor Relations 
Board99 and Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co.100—the 
Supreme Court took up the legal aspects of majority rule. 
In J.I. Case Co., the employer had offered each of its employees 
individual contracts for one year.101  About 75 percent of the employ-
ees accepted.102  During the time that the contracts were in effect, a 
union petitioned the National Labor Relations Board for an elec-
tion.103  The union won the election, but the employer refused to 
bargain on the grounds that its individual contracts with its employees 
precluded it from dealing with the union in any matter affecting the 
rights and obligations of its employees.104  The Board disagreed, and 
the Supreme Court affirmed.105  The Court ruled that 
[i]ndividual contracts, no matter what the circumstances that justify 
their execution or what their terms, may not be availed of to defeat 
or delay the procedures prescribed by the National Labor Relations 
Act looking to the collective bargaining, nor to exclude the con-
tracting employee from a duly ascertained bargaining unit.106 
The Court reasoned that the very purpose of the statute goes to group 
concerns.107  The Act has a collective rather than individual focus.  
 
 96. Ruth Weyand, Majority Rule in Collective Bargaining, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 556, 561 
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Accordingly, the Court dispelled any notion that an individual 
employee should have the freedom to contract if he can get better 
terms.  Such a notion is both disruptive and selfish: 
[A]dvantages to individuals may prove as disruptive of industrial 
peace as disadvantages.  They are a fruitful way of interfering with 
organization and choice of representatives; increased compensa-
tion, if individually deserved, is often earned at the cost of breaking 
down some other standard thought to be for the welfare of the 
group, and always creates the suspicion of being paid at the long-
range expense of the group as a whole.108 
Moreover, such a notion is undemocratic in the sense of being 
antimajoritarian: 
The workman is free, if he values his own bargaining position more 
than that of the group, to vote against representation; but the ma-
jority rules, and if it collectivizes the employment bargain, individ-
ual advantages or favors will generally in practice go in as a contri-
bution to the collective result.109 
The Court’s ruling in J.I. Case Co. is extraordinary for its atten-
tion to the collective.  It is a fascinating testament to the need for 
individual choice and the power of associations over individual 
choice.  The Court envisions the state having to force the individual 
to join the collective for the good of the collective.  It is only through 
the union that a worker obtains any real freedom in the workplace.  
Further, the Court indicates that the union is sovereign, and no 
employee can change its law to his or her benefit.  This is decidedly a 
republican vision of democracy, one that hinges on involuntary 
association rather than individual consent.110 
However, the Court was quick to qualify its position.  In Steele, 
decided shortly after J.I. Case Co., the union was the exclusive 
bargaining agent for a craft of firemen.111  A majority of the firemen 
were white, but a substantial number were black.112  All the whites 
were members, but blacks could not be, though they were required to 
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accept the union as their representative.113  The union and employer, a 
railroad, then entered into an agreement restricting the seniority 
rights of blacks.114  The question before the Court was whether the 
union had a duty to represent all the employees in the craft without 
discrimination on account of race.115  Although the Court did not hold 
that the union was a state actor, it first drew an analogy between 
unions and legislatures: 
[T]he representative is clothed with power not unlike that of a leg-
islature which is subject to constitutional limitations on its power to 
deny, restrict, destroy or discriminate against the rights of those for 
whom it legislates and which is also under an affirmative constitu-
tional duty equally to protect those rights.116 
The Court went on to find that the union had to have some duty to 
represent every employee, regardless of their race.117  Otherwise, the 
Court held, the majority could ride roughshod over the rights of the 
minority: 
Unless the labor union representing a craft owes some duty to rep-
resent non-union members of the craft, at least to the extent of not 
discriminating against them as such in the contracts which it makes 
as their representative, the minority would be left with no means of 
protecting their interests, or indeed their right to earn a livelihood 
by pursuing the occupation in which they are employed.118 
The Court phrased its reasoning in terms of equal protection: 
“Congress has seen fit to clothe the bargaining representative with 
powers comparable to those possessed by a legislative body both to 
create and restrict the rights of those whom it represents, but it has 
also imposed upon the representative a corresponding duty.”119  The 
Court did accept that unions could make rational distinctions 
between employees, such as differences in seniority or skill.120  
However, discriminations based upon race were automatically 
irrelevant.121 
Steele is best characterized as a liberal corrective.  If J.I. Case Co. 
establishes majority rule, Steele guards against majority tyranny by 
making it the job of the courts to ensure the rights of minority 
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members.  As noted above, to protect against majority tyranny, the 
state may hold involuntary associations to constitutional standards.  
In a democracy, individuals must have the right to leave groups when 
they want.  Of course, it can be argued that unions are not entirely 
involuntary in the sense that employees can always quit their jobs.  
But, this is unpersuasive because often the costs of leaving a job are 
too high for it to be considered a choice.  The state, then, must 
intervene on behalf of the employee where the union trammels the 
employee’s rights. 
The Court in Steele makes plain that the union, as a legislature, 
may be treated as an arm of the state.  The Court espouses a liberal 
conception of freedom.  Accordingly, we also see behind its reasoning 
an affirmation of a liberal conception of the self.  In this respect, it is 
interesting to note how Steele parallels the reasoning of United States 
v. Carolene Products Co.’s famous footnote.122  First, judicial inter-
vention may be required to insure access to the political process.  By 
excluding blacks from membership, the union was denying blacks 
their voice.  Second, intervention may be required where prejudice 
infects the political process, since “prejudice against discrete and 
insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to 
curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be 
relied upon to protect minorities.”123 
Note that in Steele the Court separates distinctions based upon 
race from distinctions based upon relevant factors such as seniority.124  
The Court will allow union policies that make reasonable distinctions 
among employees.125  At first blush, this difference seems difficult to 
defend.  Why are civil liberties more important than economic 
liberties?  The answer turns on, as Sandel argues, the liberal concep-
tion of self.126  Perhaps in eighteenth-century America it was fair to 
say that individuals were free moral agents and could freely contract. 
127  But today inequalities of bargaining power undercut that freedom.  
Individuals simply cannot quit jobs they do not like—economic 
conditions make doing so impossible.  Thus, legislatures should be 
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allowed to regulate the market and thereby limit freedom of contract 
in order to realize greater freedom of contract.  Government 
intervention facilitates freedom.  It provides economic security that 
results in leveling the playing field and providing the equality 
necessary for freedom of contract.  In fact, what justifies democracy is 
that it enables the right of every person to choose his or her own 
ends, regardless of social position.128  Thus, the union as legislature 
must be free to make economic policy.  In practice, this means that 
the union’s political process must be open to all, and decisions must 
be made by majority rule.  Under the liberal model, each employee 
has an equal right to express his or her preferences.  It also means 
that the majority should not be able to vote into effect an oppressive 
or prejudiced agenda.  If the union majority could vote such an 
agenda into effect, the democratic process would produce policies 
based upon beliefs that some persons are intrinsically worth less than 
others.  That runs contrary to the notion that persons should be free 
to choose regardless of their position in society. 
Steele is only a partial liberal correction.  It does not give minor-
ity employees the choice of having their own union or even no union; 
that is, it does not create an absolute right of voice and exit.  But, ac-
cepting the analogy of union as legislature,129 there is no reason why 
democracy requires exclusive representation.  Democracy can also be 
achieved through proportional representation.  In an old Labor 
Board case, Houde Engineering Corp.,130 such a scheme was in fact 
debated but ultimately dismissed in favor of exclusive representation.  
In Houde Engineering Corp., the employer faced two employee 
groups, the minority an outgrowth of the company’s athletic associa-
tion and the majority affiliated with the United Automobile Work-
ers.131  At the hearing, the employer suggested that it could bargain 
and enter into an agreement with a “composite committee” of the 
representatives of the association and the union.132  The Board con-
ceded that such a scheme would, on its face, be “just and democ-
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ratic,”133 but concluded that, even if such an agreement could be 
reached, it would not make much difference because a majority of the 
committee would have to consent to any agreement.134  Hence the 
majority representative would still control.135  The Board then added 
that proportional representation could also breed “dissention and 
rivalry” within the ranks destructive to the bargaining process.136  Too 
many voices would complicate bargaining and cause the unions to 
undercut one another. 
The Board’s ruling in Houde Engineering Corp. was practical.  Its 
concern was improving the status of employees, and exclusive 
representation seemed at the time the best way to do this.  Neverthe-
less, there are a number of reasons why proportional representation, 
or a scheme of coalition bargaining, with multiple unions representing 
multiple employee interests, might be preferred.  Most importantly, 
why should one union, and not the employer, have to deal with 
employees’ conflicting interests?  Exclusivity transfers to the union 
the responsibility of resolving employee differences before bargain-
ing.137  But it is not clear that the union is any better suited to 
resolving deep differences. 
Consider, for example, Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addi-
tion Community Organization,138 where a group of black employees, 
refusing to take their grievances through a joint union-management 
Adjustment Board, demanded that their employer negotiate with 
them directly over issues of employment discrimination in assign-
ments and promotions.139  When the employer refused, the employees 
picketed, and as a result were terminated.140  The Court ruled that the 
employees had not engaged in concerted activity protected under the 
Act, and thus could be terminated because the employees had 
circumvented the union to engage in bargaining.141  The Court 
reasoned that concerns for industrial order outweighed the right of 
the minority to act.142  It noted that an employer confronted with 
demands from multiple groups would not necessarily be able to 
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satisfy them all at once, and that the union has a legitimate interest in 
presenting a united front and in not seeing its strength dissipated by 
subgroups pursuing separate interests.143  Interestingly, the black 
employees did not raise the issue of whether the union had breached 
its duty of fair representation.  On the one hand, this might evidence 
that the union was not all that divided, and thus the union, rather 
than the employer, could best attend to their grievances.  On the 
other hand, the burden on the employee in a fair representation claim 
is heavy.  The employee must show that the union action was 
“arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.”144  Thus, the white workers 
in the union may have been tolerant, but the black workers’ 
disagreement with the whites over skilled jobs or affirmative action 
was so deep-seated that conflict was inevitable.  And if this was the 
case, the black workers could never get fair representation, and they 
would always be worse off with a union.  In such circumstances, it 
seems unduly harsh to say that the minority cannot bypass the 
majority.  It was not as if the minority was attempting to speak for the 
majority.  It simply wanted a voice of its own. 
Are racial divisions unique or may other differences, such as 
class divisions, also benefit from a system of nonmajority representa-
tion?  Steele indicates that unions may differentiate among workers 
on the basis of skill.145  Where those who are financially better off 
suffer by union representation, the liberal vision of freedom under-
girding the duty of fair representation is satisfied.  The wealth is 
simply being more evenly distributed.  However, where those at the 
bottom of the scale are always worse off, such as with a contract that 
provides good pensions but low wages, it cannot be argued on the 
grounds of distributive justice that the majority should rule.  Those at 
the bottom may be better off without representation at all.  Yet 
allowing those at the bottom to form their own union, that is, allowing 
proportional representation, could present another problem.  For 
example, in a union of permanent and contingent workers, where the 
permanent workers are the minority, the contingent workers are 
usually better off.  In such a case, the union will aim for a wage just 
high enough to please the permanent workers, whom the employer 
wants to keep, with the excess going to the contingent workers.  By 
contrast, under proportional representation, if the permanent 
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workers are allowed to form their own union, the permanent workers 
may realize their full worth on their own.  The contingent workers 
cannot then get as much, as the employer does not need to offer them 
as much because the employer views them as easily replaceable.  
Thus, under proportional representation, the wage gap increases.146 
Of course, we do not want greater wage inequality.  But, this pos-
sibility considers that the union only exists for the sake of collective 
bargaining.  It is entirely feasible that contingent workers may want 
their own voice for other reasons.  They may want a union that will 
help them get other jobs or train them in new skills.  Or, they may 
want a union that pushes for political change, like living-wage 
legislation.  This is not to say economic difference is tantamount to 
racial or religious difference, but that differences must be tolerated.  
This is a pragmatic view based upon our fragmentation.  As long as 
individuals have different ends because of their backgrounds, 
government ought not allow one group of individuals supremacy over 
another. 
Note that proportional representation, in protecting individual 
freedom of choice, bolsters the best of what republicans and liberals 
see in unions as associations.  Kohler argues that unions should be as 
small as practicable, as small groups better facilitate deliberation: 
“They make more likely the personal knowledge, friendship and trust 
among participants that ground the possibility of conversation and 
consensus.”147  Proportional representation allows employees to 
divide into smaller, more homogenous groups.  Each union in the 
workplace may stand for an interest, such as affirmative action or 
lower pensions and higher wages.  To be sure, proportional represen-
tation could lead to greater balkanization.  Do we really want white 
unions and black unions?  On the other hand, if there are more 
unions, there is more choice, and we might find that workers of 
different stripes share common ground on certain issues.  Addition-
ally, proportional representation might encourage greater employee 
participation in the inner workings of their union.148  Under a 
republican view, we must hope for such debate.  Under a liberal view, 
the state ensures such debate.  But, if employees could form their own 
union, they could demand and expect greater responsiveness from it.  
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Competition for members could even arise between unions.  At the 
least, as unions would stand for an interest, employees would know 
that their union would be fighting for their interest.  Reciprocally, the 
state would not need to monitor unions’ inner workings.  As noted, 
under the liberal view, the state preserves the right of exit by limiting 
the power that private groups exercise over their members.  But, 
under a pragmatic view, just because groups have to be tolerant of 
one another does not mean that they have to be tolerant of their 
members.  Assuming members of groups are bound by their ends, 
mutual respect for political purposes only requires that groups agree 
to let members of other groups pursue their own ends.  It does not 
require groups to allow their members to pursue different ends.  
Thus, under proportional representation, there would be no duty of 
fair representation.  Unions would not have to respect dissent. 
CONCLUSION 
Michael Sandel and Thomas Kohler offer an intriguing portrait 
of unions as mediating bodies based upon a republican, rather than 
liberal, conception of the self.  However, in their concern for our 
increasing fragmentation, they fail to consider that reform may best 
begin with such fragmentation.  We do not need a correct conception 
of the self to make a good society; we need a system for connecting 
differently encumbered selves.  Applying this view to labor law, we 
should adopt a system of nonmajority representation, or proportional 
representation, allowing smaller groups of employees to form their 
own unions to fulfill their own ends. 
